Since income-maintenance is widely conceded to be the heart of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, much attention has focused on the administration of the budeet. How is the budget for a family established, and how may it be modified; how often is it changed and under what circumstances? How much caseworker-client interaction is there in the area of budget, how much friction over the allocation and expendit.ure of funds?
Basing their conclusions on survey data collected from Wisconsin AFDC recipients in six counties, the authors find that budget levels do not fluctuate much and there is little caseworker intervention in client spending. On the other hand, clients take lit~le advantage of the'flexible features for supplementing their budgets., such as Special Needs Items, and att~npt to get by on their basic monthly checks.
If the budg~t is not a subject of cor-troversy between caseworker and client, or of control over the client by the case~~rker, it is due in large part to the lack of discussion between them. Despite paper provisions for extra needs 2nd elaborate provisions for treating earned income of family members, most women operate on budgets that a~e static, unresponsive, and, at best, minimal.
" lncom~maintenance ib the cor~of the Aid to fa~ilies with Jependent Children program (AFDC). Beyonci all else, the most basic need of the welfare cliant is economic. How and to what extent this need is handled bears on practically every policy issue Of the program. And for this reason t some of the harshest criticisms of public assistance concern the administration of AFDC budgets.
The following are some of the major criticisms:
(1) Not only is the computation of the basic budgets' very complicated but they are also suqject to frequent changes.
Not only do the casevorkers themselves frequently fail to figure the budgets correctly, but they also fail to explain the reasons for the budget, as well as the changes, to the clients. The result is .that the system appears to the clients mysterious and highly discretionary, if not arbitrary.
(2) The usual approach of AFDC is to set basic budgets at minimum levels of subsistence and then provide a program of extra allowances for special needs or exceptional circumstances. In some states, such as Wisconsin, the special grants provisions are quite liberal, at least as they appear on the books. Nevertheless. it is claimed, the success of these programs fs largely nullified because caseworkers do not advise clients on what is available or they discourage clients from asking for extra monies. Furthermore. the system itself requires the client to ask t justify. and in-fact beg, for items that are really necessities, the types of things that other people in our affluent society enjoy without question.
The result of this system is the humiliation and de~radation of welfare clients.
(3) A basic principle established by federal law was that AFDC assistance be in the form of a money payment and that the client have freedom of choice in spending it. One of the purposes of this requirereent
was to remove the stigma thought attached to assistance in kind. It is claimed s however, that in fact there is extensive caseworker supervision over how clients spend the money payment because budgets are calculated at low levels, are changed often, and special needs have to be justified.
Thus, the caseworker does in fact review how the money is spent.
(4) Budget administration of this character gives the casevJorker extensive discretionary control over the welfare client and places the client in a very dependent, powerless s and resentful position vis-a-vis the caseworker. It iss in fact, a coercive relationship which is further complicated by the rehabilitative or social service component of AFDC.
This social service component gives the caseworker extensive authority to inquire into and attempt to change the non-economic aspects of the AFDC family. It is claimed, however, that a social service relationship cannot
be built on what is already a coercive relationship, and that the result is a further invasion of the privacy of welfare clients. This is one reason why it is argued that social services must be separated from income maintenance.
These are some of the more serious charges made against the aoministration of AFDC budgets. In this paper, we will attempt to examine some of these issues. First, we will examine the Wisconsin state policies and then we will. turn to the clients themselves. We will attempt to show how in fact budgets are made and how, from the clients Y point of view, they are administered.
A. State Policy
The determination of financial need is a continuing process. It is based on the difference between the client's resourc~s and her needs. The budget for the AFDC family is separated into three parts:
(1) Combined Allowance, (2) Shelter~(3) Special Need Items.
The Combined Allowance covers food 9 clothing, personal expenses, fuel, utilities~regular school expenses~and household supplies. It is reduced when fuel and/or utilities is included in the rent or other shelter cost. The allo\o7ance is a state-wide standard. At the time of this study~the monthly allowance for AFDC was as follows: $ 43  2  99  87  91  79  3  126  114  118  109  4  149  137  141  129  5  187  171  177  161  6  217  201  207  191  7  248  232  238  222   8   275  259  265  249   9   304  238  294  278  10  329  313  319  303   11 Add $30 per additional person to the appropriate and over allowance for 10 persons.
*Effective July 1, 1967
t To the above allowance: Add $8 for each child 13 years thru 20. Deduct $9 for each child 5 yrs. and younger. . Home o\VUership is allowed if the cost does not exceed lI a fair rental for modest housing according to community standards." This rule is a guideline since "absolute compliance will not always be possib1e."
The homeowning family is to be allowed $4.00 per month for minor upkeep and repairs.
The rental allowance is for the actual rent that must be paid but "the cost shall not exceed a fair rental for modest housing according to community standards." Counties can set rent maximums, subject to state review, if they are "realistic." They can also budget less than the actual rent if the rent is considered "excessive" but in this event the agencies have to budget "at least the amount of rental of modest housing."
If fuel and utilities are not included in the rent, the allowance rates There are 23 Special Need Items applicable to AFDC families. Host are described in Table 2 . Reasonable cost, plus $30 for food when meals provided.
As paid, prior to or following move, substantiated by estimate, receipt or billing.
As paid. Not to include tuition, school luncnes, special uniforms.
As paid. Hhere the chUd must attend school out of his school district or at the request of the parent, an allowance may be made for transportation.
When necessary to improve or maintain housing standards.
llien required for electricity, water, fuel, or an essential telephone.
To avoid nursing home care and/or when the spouse must pay for necessary services that he or she is unable to provide because of caring for the recipient.
Special allowances are also authorized for life insurance premiums if the insured has dependent beneficiaries and her physical or mental condition is such that she ·cannot obtain other insurance. Separate rules cover education and training expenses. Regular monthly expenses for normal school supplies (~., pencils, paper, ink, notebooks, etc.) are included in the Combined Allowance. Special needs grant can be made for book and locker rents, towel service, laboratory and shop fees, activity fees, materials and supplies for industrial arts, home economics, art instruction and "other similar classes. Ii Adults may also get~as a special need, the cost of tuition, books~supplies, or "other miscellaneous needs." If the parent has sufficient earnings, the cost of child care is deducted from the earnings. If the parent is not working, this cost can be bucgeted if the parent is in a training course "likely-to lead to employment," or if child care is necessary because of the parent's physical or mental incapacity.
During the period of this study~the average grant per AFDC family in the six counties, together with comparisons of the family's "poverty line" was as follO\l7s: 
The grant per family does not necessarily reflect the family's The Wisconsin state AFDC system is fairly liberal in comparison with those of other states. There is no maximum grant per family regardless of need, thus 100 per cent of need is always budgeted. In addition, average grants per family are comparatively high. As far as the Wisconsin AFDC families are concerned, the program-combines regular support at fairly low levels (at least as compared to poverty line standards) with a system of flexibly administered grants to take care of exceptional needs. This combination, it is argued, places very 41n addition to money payments, AFDC recipients are automatically eligible for Medicaid, which' covers, without cost to the recipients, medical, dental, hospital and drug costs.
SIn an independent study, Joseph Heffersan has found that 83.6% of the total income of AFDC recipients comes from their grant. However, half of the women had no income other than their grant. In Table 5 we have tabulated by county the percentages of AFDC clients who reported having discussions with their caseworkers about their budgets, and the clients' reactions to these discussions. About three-quarters of the sample reported this activity, and there was not much variation among the counties. Very few of the clients were bothered or annoyed by the discussions. Over 40 per cent found the discussions l/usua11y" or "veriI helpful. Only about a quarter found them "not at all" helpful. There was some variation among the rural counties, suggesting differences in administrative methods. Thus, despite the fact that budget and eligibility are supposed to be subject to constant review, aid grants were changed infrequently. The advantage of this pattern of administration is, of course, that it gives the AFDC family a measure of stability-· they know how much they can count on from month to month. On the other hand, the pressure of low AFDC budgets is supposed to be relieved by the flexibility of the system: individual: family needs change and budgets should change accordingly. Unless we assume that needs did not change very much over the course of a year--probably an unlikely assumption--budgets were not administered flexibly.
How did the grant changes come about? For over 80 per cent of those reporting grant changes, the changes were "more or less automatic" and the client did not "have to bring special facts to the attention of the caseworker" to bring the change about. The rest of the sample participated actively in about one grant~hange.
Finally, more than four fifths of those who had changes in the aid grant said that their caseworkers did tell them the reasons for the changes and that they "usually understood vlhy the changes were made."
The tabulations for the aid grant changes are in Table 6 .
13 .9
1.0 *Average for the last three years or since coming on the program.
In considering the relationship between being able to manage on the budget and making special requests, it could be argued that those who have difficulty in managing would be more likely to make requests.
On the otller hand, since a high proportion of requests are granted (see Table 8 ), those who make requests would be better able to manage pretty
well. In four counties (Brown, Walworth, Sauk and Dodge), two-thiroci of the clients who said that they could not manage, made requests. Of those who could manage, only about half made requests. In }1ilwaukee and Dane Counties, there was no relationship between being able to manage and making requests. About the same percentage of responder.ts made~equests, regardle~s of whether or not they thought they were able to manage pretty well.
What do the welfare clients ask for? In Table 8 we have tabulated the percentage of the requests granted, and the percentage of all the respondents that had received money for these items.
More than half (56.2 per cent) of the requests made were for essential items: clothing, household goods, special food, and home necessities, as compared to requests that might be classified as rehabilitation or social service: day care, telephone, transportation, education, employment retraining, and school needs. The percentage of requests granted seems high; overall two-tllirds uf all requests for extra money to meet special needs were granted.
For some items, such as day care help, it may be fairly assumed that no reasonable request was denied. However; despite a "good record" on granting requests, in fact few welfare clients benefited from the program because so few requests were made. With the exception of the third of all respondents who benefited from household goods, the proportions of welfare clients receiving extra grants were very small.
Practically 90 per cent of the respondents received nothing extra for rehabilitative or social service needs. It would not be unfair to conclude that the special grants program is a paper program only.
Welfare recipients existed primarily on their basic~id grants.
In Table 9 we have tabulated by county the percentage of clients requesting particular items, the percentage of the requests granted, and the percentage of respondents who had their requests granted. 
The results in Table 9 , the rural counties and Brovm County were behind Dane and Milwaukee Counties in proportions of clients making requests. A request must be based on need--a client is not likely to request a special grant for an item unless she needs it. But although we have no data on actual needs, it seems highly unlikely that the differences in clients requesting items were based on differences in actual need. Twenty-five per cent of the Dane County recipients had received extra money for clothing as compared to seven per cent of the BrolYn County recipients; for telephones, the percentages receiving money were 26.8 in Dane compared to 1.2 in Brown,for transportation, 22.9 to 5.8, and sQcon. In several of the counties for many items, the proportion of recipients actually receiving money was so small, it may fairly be said that the availility of special grants is meaningless.
Because two-thirds of all requests were granted, it is not surprising that the welfare recipients who made requests also thought that the caseworkers were either usually or ahTays fair "in granting or refusing requests .." The only county proving the exception was Sauk County, where more "unfairness" was felt. *Percentages are of only those 't"ho made requests.
A third of the respondents did not..ask for special grants. In Table 11 we have tabulated their reasons. food~-extra clothing) or are designed to encourage independence (e.g., employment re-training). In other words, it should be the job of the
caseworkers to encourage clients to make better use of the program.
Reasons for the lack of this program's use are probably more subtle than portrayed in the literature as evidenced by the data in Table 11 , as well as the other data on special grants. There is little indication of complete ignorance on the part of the clients; only 3.8
per ce~t of all the respondents said they didn't ask because they didn't know about the program. Also, only 6.5 per cent said they thought the agency would refuse,' and less than one per cent· were so hostile to the program that they.didn't want to ask anything more of it than they had to. On the other hand, there is greater evidence that the purpose of the special grant program was never really expl~ined, or understood by the clients. Most of the respondents did know about the programj they did request at least once; the request was usually g anted;
and they thought that the caseworker decisions were fair. Unfortunately, we did not ask the respondents why they didn't ask for additional items. Perhaps they thought they would be refused, or were discouraged _ _ _ _ _ _~fr_Qm~aking-more-than-Qne-0r-two-requests.
For most of the respondents, administration of the budget was ve~passive.
Aid grant changes and special requests were infrequ~nt.
For a small number, however, there was more direct regulation; 7.7 per cent of the respondents said that at one time or another the caseworkers had expressed disapproval of the way they' spent their money.
(The caseworkers expressed disapproval twice, on the average). Poor budgeting, spending too much for clothing or food, buying "extras,t such as toys, treats or bicycles for children, and buying "extras"
for oneself were some practices of which caseworkers disapproved.
When regulation began to bite, as with specific caseworker disapproval, client attitudes reflected it in a much higher proportion of expressing negative or hostile feelings. In Table 12 we co~pared 21 attitudes toward general budget discussions and attitudes toward case" worker disapproval. Conclusions:
Though data in this paper do not reach all of the criticisms made against the administration of AFDC budgets, nevertheless, a pattern emerges which does qualify if not refute some of the criticisms.
-----------
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The static nature of the money payments and supplements is the dominant feature of the administration of AFDC budgets. Basic budgets are relatively stable, with only one grant change per year, and with clients making only one special request per year. In general, our evidence indicates that most clients receive the same size check month after month. This allows an element of predictability but, conversely, there is little flexibility in income maintenance. Clients do not ask for much and do not get much. Despite the low levels of budgets and the slight impact of provisions for special needs, clients generally say that they are able to manage on their budgets. Even so, when asked about the bad points of the AFDC program, respondents were far more likely to complain. of the inadequacy of grants than of_lany other feature.
On the evidence iii this paper, our conclusion must be that the 
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clients made more special requests or experienced more frequent changes in their basic aid grant, they were more likely to encounter C::JsewoJ.lo..<= disapproval of the way they handled money. This is not surprising; if budgets become topics for discussion more often, some conflict or regulation is more likely. But it should be remembered that for most clients the level of administrative, and therefore regulative, activity is very low indeed. This would suggest that one of the prices for little caseworker supervision or disapproval may have been the very low level of activity, or lack of responsiveness and flexibility of the system. Under the present structural arrangements, it is indeed possible that a more flexible, responsive system for handling money disbursement would result in the very thing which is anathema to the critics of the present system: a more coercive relationship between caseworker and client.
